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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explore sorne issues about the intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice. The paper considers an agent who faces alternative feasible 
sets of alternatives A, B, etc. Each one of these sets is a non-empty subset of 
sorne given universal set of alternatives X. The agent has to choose exactly one 
alternative from one of these sets. The intuition behind this paper is that freedom 
of choice is valuable in itself. The problem considered is how to rank different sets 
according to the freedom that they offer. The paper focus on the capacity of the 
sets to pravide meaningful choices. 1 will discriminate between the alternatives 
that constitute meaningful choices and those that do not, using as reference the set 
of preferences that a reasonable person may have and considering the alternatives 
that they may choose in the universal set of alternatives. 
The need for introducing preferences into the analysis of the freedom was 
pointed out by Sen (1991). In his idea of effective freedom an individual is free 
if she has access to alternatives that she regards as valuable in terms of sorne 
criteria. This criteria may be her preferences or, as in Pattanaik and Xu (1997), 
the preferences that a reasonable person in her place may have. 
The use of the preferences of a reasonable person as a reference point for the 
evaluation of the freedom that a set of alternatives offers was suggested by Jones 
and Sugden (1982) and considered by Pattanaik and Xu (1997). According to 
Jones and Sugden (1982) "if any reasonable person would be indifferent between 
two particular alternatives, then offering choice contributes to little diversity." 
Pattanaik and Xu (1997) takes the role of preferences a step forward. According 
to them, the intrinsic value of freedom of choice should be judged "not [in terms 
of] the preferences that the agents actuaHy have, nor the preferences ordering 
as his future preference ordering, but the preference orderings that a reasonable 
person in the agent's situation can possibly have." The model they propose has 
the virtue of capturing effeetive freedom without coHapsing into an indirect utility 
ranking. 
In comparing two opportunity sets, A and B, Pattanaik and Xu (1997) con­
centrate on A and B, where A is the set of aH alternatives in A which reasonable 
persons may choose from the feasible set A and similarly for B. However, in this 
paper 1 foHow an approach that differs fram this. 1 consider first the set X of 
aH alternatives in the universal set X that reasonable people will choose if the 
universal set were the feasible set and then concentrate on X n A and X n B 
in comparing A and B. The intuitive difference between the procedure of Pat­
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tanaik and Xu (1997) and the procedure discussed here may be illustrated with 
an example. Consider the case where the universal set of alternatives X contain 
four alternatives: life in prison, to be beheaded, to be hanged and to be killed 
in the electric chair. Suppose that there are two sets of alternatives A and B to 
be ranked. The set A contains three alternatives: to be beheaded, to be hanged 
and to be killed in the electric chair. The set B contains two alternatives: to 
be hanged and to be killed in the electric chair. It is not unthinkable that any 
reasonable person in a society will prefer life to any of the other alternatives. 
It is also reasonable to think that facing the possibility of death, we can find a 
reasonable person who may prefer any of the possible methods in X or may be 
indifferent between them. 
The first rule charaeterized by Pattanaik and Xu (1997) considers relevant 
alternatives in the comparison of A and B those in A and B. A set offers more 
freedom than other if it contains more of the relevant alternatives. In that case, A 
is considered offering more freedom than B. In a second characterization the rule 
takes into account the number of alternatives that are contained in the intersection 
of each of the sets A or B and the choices of a reasonable person in AUB, i.e. A U B 
nA and A U B nB, again A is considered offering more freedom than B. Both 
characterizations give importance in terms of freedom of choice to alternatives 
that are irrelevant for the agent. This is in the sense that these alternatives will 
never be chosen by reasonable person if there were no feasibility constraints over 
the alternatives. The alternatives in A or B are unable to fulfill the vital project 
of a reasonable person because no reasonable person will ever choose them. A 
reasonable person will never choose to be beheaded at dawn as the alternative 
that helps her "shaping his [her] life in accordance with sorne overall plan" or 
"giving meaning to his [her] life" or "being with the capacity so to shape his 
life can have or strive for a meaningful life" (Nozick 1974 p. 50). The idea 
to consider only those options which are capable of "shaping ones own life" is 
captured formally in this paper using X n A and X n B in comparing A and B. 
In the example both sets A, B are declared indifferent in terms of the freedom 
they offer because no reasonable person will choose an alternative in these sets if 
this choice is not constrained. 
Choosing for oneself and shaping ones own life is essential for a meaningful 
human life. The alternatives that can be chosen by a reasonable person in a 
society where no constraints exists are the ones that allow the agents to shape 
their lives and provide them with full control over themselves. They allow the 
agents to formulate plans and choosing among these plans an agent is considering 
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alternative steps in her vital project. If what is relevant to measure the freedom 
contained in a set depends on the composition of the particular set then a person 
that has to choose between three different ways to die can have more freedom 
than other who has to choose between life and death. Also, a slave who has to 
choose among hundreds escape plans can have more freedom than her master who 
decides among lesser options, even when the masters options are more real and 
desirable to the eyes of any reasonable person than the freedom dreams of the 
slave. 
To use as reference the set of alternatives a reasonable person may choose 
generate situations that may seem puzzling. This is because alternatives that are 
not feasible are having a role in evaluating the freedom that a set offers. Let's 
consider a situation where all the reasonable persons in a society believe that the 
woman a is the most desirable mate. These preferences may seem inadequate 
when dealing with the perspective of a reasonable mate but it is close to the 
set of reasonable preferences that kids might have about a particular toy as the 
best Christmas presento In that case the sets A = {e, d, b} and B = {d, b} are 
indifferent in terms of the number of alternatives that intersect with X. Since 
that a being unanimously considered the best possible choice seems hardly enough 
reason to claim that A or B contains as much freedom as the empty seto It can 
be argued that, if the social consensus so described then only a can fulfill their 
vital project, in that case the election of other person when a is not available will 
fulfill only utilitarian purposes. 
The example is, somehow, pathological. A reasonable person may have any 
preference that is not contradictory or illogical. In the example it is not unthink­
able that any woman can be a reasonable mate and be a choice of sorne reasonable 
persono The freedom attributed to a set depends on the preferences that can be 
conceived as reasonable by a person in her situation. These preferences will be 
paradoxical only if the preferences attributed to a reasonable people in her situa­
tion are too. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces sorne notation 
and definitiollS. Section 3 contains the main characterization resulto The rule 
characterized provide a complete arder of the sets of alternatives. In Section 
4 two lexicographic versions of the previous rule are considered. The relation 
between the original approach and its lexicographic versions is also discussed . 
The paper finishes with sorne final remarks in Section 5. 
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2.	 Notation and definitions 
Let X be the universal set of alternatives, assumed to be finite. At any given 
time, the set of alternatives available to the individual will be a non-empty subset 
of X, and she has to choose exactly one alternative from this set of available 
alternatives. 
Let Z be the set of aH non-empty subsets of X. The elements of Z are the fea­
sible sets that the agent may face. Let t be a binary relation defined over Z. For 
aH A, B E Z, [A t B] means that A offers at least as much freedom as B. For aH 
A, B E Z, [A >- B iff A t B and -, (B t A)] and [A I"V B iff A t B and -, (B t A)] . 
The reference set ofpreference orderings over X is denoted as gJ = (R1, ••• , Rn ). 
A preference ordering over X is a refiexive, complete and transitive weak prefer­
ence relation, at least as good as, over X. gJ will be interpreted as the set of aH 
possible preference orderings over X that a reasonable person may have. 1 denote 
by max(A) the set of aH alternatives x in A such that x is a best alternative in 
X for sorne ordering in gJ and let P(gJ) = max(X). 1 will caH P(gJ) the set of 
relevant alternatives in X. 
Now 1 consider a number of properties that the binary relation t over Z may 
satisfy. 
Definition 2.1. A binary reIation t over Z satisfies: 
1.	 indifference of no-choice situations (INS) iff, for all x, y E X, {x} I"V {y} ; 
2.	 simple non-dominance (SND) iff, for alI x, y E X, if# max( {x}) = # max( {y} ), 
then {x} I"V {y}; 
3.	 inclusion monotonicity (IMON) iff, for all A, B E Z if A 2 B and max(A \ 
B) =1- 0, then A >- B. If A 2 B and max(A \ B) = 0, then A I"V B; 
4.	 composition (COM) iff, for all A, B, C, D E Z, such that A nC = B nD = 0 
and A, B, C, D ~ P(gJ), 
[AtB andCtD] - [AUCtBUD], and, 
[A t B and C >- D] - [A U C >- BU D]. 
The preceding axioms are versions of traditional ones adapted to the context 
of the paper. This provides them with new meaning. The INS axiom is a classical 
axiom. We can think in situations where INS fail to capture the idea of effective 
4 
freedom. For example consider two situations, such that in each case you must 
read a book. In the first case the book considered is a telephone direetory. In 
the second, the book is one that a reasonable person may have chosen from the 
set of aH the available books ever written. INS will rank both sets as indifferent. 
In terms of freedom both the situations are different. The second set contains a 
book to read. No reasonable person will consider the telephone directory a reading 
book, this set is empty from a reader's point of view and thus less preferred than 
the one containing a book that a reasonable person may choose. INS cannot 
capture this situation where we are comparing between a set containing a book 
and an empty seto In the model the spirit of INS is captured by SND when the 
alternatives compared are both relevant. The cardinality rule charaeterized in the 
next section do not satisfy INS but satisfy SND. 
IMON adapts a preference independent axiom, called by Sen (1991) weak 
dominance. IMON requires that inclusion in terms of relevant alternatives implies 
preference. It also restrains the role of no relevant alternative and exclude them 
from being considered when a set is compared with one of its subsets. 
The axiom of COM was originally defined by Sen (1991). He requires only 
that A n e = B n D = 0. As Pattanaik and Xu (1997) remarks, there may be 
differences in the contributions that sets e and D give to A and B. To avoid this 
problem Pattanaik and Xu (1997) reduces the sets to be considered those where 
all A U e and B U D are relevant alternatives. In line with the same approach. 
I simplify the axiom in the context defined in this paper. It is enough that the 
sets considered are subsets of the set of relevant alternatives P(p) and it is not 
necessary to establish conditions over their union. 
3. The result 
In this seetion I characterize the binary relation defined by the cardinality rule in 
terms of relevant alternatives. This is, for all A, B E Z, 
A ;::;* B ~ # max(A) ~ # max(B) 
a set A will be declared preferred B if and only if the number of relevant alter­
natives A contains is bigger that the number of relevant alternatives contained in 
B. 
Proposition 3.1. ;::; satisfies SND, COM and IMON if and only if ;::;=;::;*. 
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Proof. 
The necessity part of the proposition is obvious; I prove only the sufficiency 
parto Let ~ satisfy SND, COM and IMON. First, I show: 
for all A,B E Z, if #max(A) = #max(B) , then A f'V B. (3.1) 
SupposeA,B E Z and # max (A) = #max(B) =g.Letmax(A) = {al, ... ,ag} 
and max (B) = {bl , ... , bg }. By SND, 
(3.2) 
and 
{a2} {b2} . (3.3)f'V 
{ad n {bl} = {a2} n {b2} = 0 and, further max ({al}) = {ad ,max ({a2}) = {a2} 
and max({bl}) = {bl} ,max({b2}) = {b2} , since al,a2 E max(A) and bl ,b2 E 
max (B) . Rence by 3.2, 3.3 and COM, I have 
(3.4) 
By SND, again, 
(3.5) 
By 3.4, 3.5 and COM, 
{al,a2,a3} {b l ,b2,b3}. (3.6)f'V 
Proceeding in this way, I finally have {al, .oo, ag} f'V {bl , .oo, bg}, that is max (A) f'V 
max (B) . If A = max(A), then A max (B). Suppose {A\ max(A)} =1- 0. Letf'V 
{A\ max(A)} = {al, oo., am } =1- 0. It is clear that TI = max(A) u {al, ... ,am } is 
such that TI ~ A and max(A \ TI) = 0. Then by IMON TI max (B). Rence I f'V 
have 
A f'V max (B) . (3.7) 
SimilarIy, by the use of IMON, from 3.7, A f'V B, which proves 3.l. 
Next, I show: 
forallA,BEZ, if#max(A) > #max(B) , thenA>-B. (3.8) 
Suppose A, B E Z and # max (A) > # max (B) . Let # max (B) = 9 and # max (A) = 
g+t (where t > O). further, let max(B) = {bl , ... , bg} andmax (A) = {al, ... ,ag, oo., ag+t}. 
Note that max{al' ... ,ag} = {al, ... ,ag}. Rence, by 3.1, 
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{al, ... , ag} rv B (3.9) 
since max(A) = {al, ,ag, ... ,agH} it is clear that Tg+l = max{al, ... ,ag} U 
{ag+d is such that {al, ,ag} ~ Tg+I and max(Tg+l \ {al, ... ,ag}) # 0. Then by 
IMON and 3.9, it follows that 
and by 3.9 
Tg+I >- max (B) (3.10) 
Taking 3.10, adding ag+2, ... , ag+t on the left hand side, and using IMON repeat­
edly, I have 
{al, ... , ag+t} >- B (3.11) 
Taking 3.11 and using similar argument for the proof of 3.7, by IMON, I have 
A >- B, which proves 3.8. 3.1 and 3.8 complete the proof of the sufficiency part 
of the proposition. I 
The binary relation t,* is transitive. In this relation indifferences between 
two set may arise because the sets considered have empty intersection with P (p) 
or because the intersection has the same number of elements. In both cases, 
particularly in the first one, a lexicographic version of the original rule may enrich 
the ranking and allows to determine the indifferences. 
4. A lexicographic approach 
I have pointed out in the introduction that the set of preferences that a reason­
able person may have should be rich enough and take into account any valuable 
alternative in terms of freedom. Nevertheless, there may be situations where the 
aspirations of a reasonable person in X cannot be satisfied by the sets to be 
compared too Let's consider the example of a country where free press is not 
available but there is a consensus that free newspapers are the unique relevant 
choice. Even in that case it can be claimed that different sets of newspapers may 
provide alternatives that deserves sorne value in terms of freedom. 
Admitting this possibility, a way to adapt the previous approach to be used 
in this situation is to remove the first element in all the reasonable person's pref­
erences and compare the available sets of newspapers according with this new set 
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of reasonable preferences and proceed in this way if possible till the indifference 
is determined. This enriches the discrimination of the proposed approach making 
it according to the alternatives available in the sets to be considered. Clearly the 
sequentiaHy considered alternatives as reference are not representing the absolute 
idea of freedom proposed in the first section of this paper but a compromised 
idea of freedom that can only be justified when the set of reasonable preferences 
cannot distinguish among the sets of alternatives. 
Two different lexicographic versions are studied in this section. The first one 
eliminates the most preferred elements in a reasonable person's preferences until 
the preferences are able to discriminate between both sets. A second lexicographic 
ranking proposes a stronger criterion. This second criterion will declare A pre­
ferred over B only if the intersection of A with the set of relevant alternatives 
generated from the sequential elimination of the most preferred elements in the 
set of reasonable persons' preferences is always equal or bigger than B's. 
Let RJ be the preference where best elements have been removed and 1 denote 
the set of alternatives in X that are in RJ as RJ. in general 
R~ {R~-l - {8} IVy,x E R~-l,X E 8 ~ xR~-ly } 
where R; - {8} denotes the preference R; where the alternatives in 8 have been 
removed. 1 denote by gJi = (Rl, ... ,R~) the set of preference orderings over X 
where the best elements have been removed i times from the set of preferences 
that a reasonable person may have. Thus maxi(A) is the set of aH alternatives x 
in A such that x is a best alternative in X for sorne ordering in gJi. Let P(ti) be 
the set of alternatives in maxi(X). 
For aH A, B E Z, [A.t i B] will be interpreted as "A offers at least as much 
freedom as B according with gJi." For aH A, B E Z, [A >-i B iff A .ti B and 
-, (B .ti A)] and [A "-Ji B iff A .ti B and -, (B .ti A)]. 
Now 1 consider a number of properties of the binary relation .t over Z. 
Definition 4.1. A binary relation .t over Z satisfies; 
1.	 simple non-dominance by levels (SNDi ) iff, for all x, y E X, [if # maxi(x) = 
#maxi(y), then {x} "-Ji {y}]; 
2.	 inclusion monotonicity by levels (IMa#-) iff, for all A, B E Z if A ;2 B and 
maxi(A \ B) =J 0, then A >-i B. If A ;2 B and maxi(A \ B) = 0, then 
A "-Ji B', 
8 
3.	 property 1 (P-l) iff, for all A, B E Z if # maxi(A) = # maxi(B) for all i, 
then A rv B; 
4.	 property 2 (P-2) iff, for all A, B E Z if # maxi(A) > # maxi(B) and 
#maxj(A) = #maxj(B) for all j < i, then A>- B; 
5.	 property 3 (P-3) iff, for all A, B E Z if there is a level i such that # maxi (A) > 
#maxi(B), then -,(B ~ A). 
The first two axioms are an adaptation of SND and IMON defined in Section 
1. They apply to the different levels in which the set of relevant alternatives 
may be defined. The axioms P-1, P-2 and P-3 are three preference dependent 
axioms. Property 1 establishs that if two sets have the same number of relevant 
alternatives for any g;i both the sets are indifferent. The axiom P-2 establishs that 
A is preferred to B in terms of freedom if the number of relevant alternatives in 
A is bigger that in B according to P(g;i) and no other P(pi) j < i gives different 
number of relevant alternatives for one of the sets. Axiom P-3 implies that if A 
has more relevant elements than B according with sorne P(g;i) then B is not going 
to be declared prefer to A. 
The binary relation ~i that represents a lexicographic version of ~* is such 
that, 
for	 aH A BE Z [A >-i B iff { #.maxj(A) = #ma~j(B) for aH j < i ] (4.1) 
, 'rv :32	 such that # maxt(A) > # maxt(B). 
Proposition 4.2. ~ satisfies 8NDi , CONI, P-l, P-2 and IMONí if and only if 
>-_>-i 
,.-.....¡-,-....,,¡ • 
Proof. 
The necessity part of the proposition is obvious; 1 prove only the sufficiency 
parto Let ~ satisfy SNDi , COM, P-1, P-2 and IMONi . First, 1 show: 
for	 aH A, B E Z, if # maxi (A) = # maxi (B) for aH i, then A rv B. (4.2) 
Suppose A, B E Z and # maxi (A) = # maxi (B) - g. Let maxi (A) = 
{al, ... ,ag} and maxi (B) = {bl , ... , bg} . By SNDi , 
{al} rv i {bl }	 (4.3) 
and 
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{a2} /"Vi {b2}. (4.4) 
{ad n {bl } = {a2} n {b2} = 0 and, further maxi ({al}) = {al} ,maxi ({a2}) = 
{a2} and maxi ({b l }) = {b l }, maxi ({b2}) = {b2} (since al, a2 E maxi (A) and 
bl , b2 E maxi (B)). Hence by 4.3,4.4 and COM, 1 have 
(4.5) 
By SNDi, again, 
(4.6) 
By 4.5, 4.6 and COM, 
{al,a2,a3} /"Vi {b l ,b2,b3}. (4.7) 
Proceeding in this way 1finally have {al, ... ,ag} /"Vi {bl , ... ,bg} , that is maxi (A) /"Vi 
maxi (B). lE A = maxi(A), then A /"Vi maxi (B). Suppose {A\maxi(A)} =1- 0. Let 
{A\ maxi(A)} = {al, ... ,am } =1- 0. It is clear that TI = maxi(A) U {ad is such that 
TI ~ A and maxi(A \ TI) = 0. Then by IMONi and 4.7, 1 have A /"Vi maxi (B) in 
this case. Thus, in all cases, 
(4.8) 
Similarly using IMONi in 4.8, A /"Vi B for all i. By P-1 A /"V B,which proves 4.2. 
Next, 1 show: 
forallA BEZ if {#maxj(A)=#ma~.i(B)forallj.<i thenA>-B. 
, , :Ji such that # max1 (A) > # max1 (B) 
(4.9) 
Suppose A, B E Z and # maxi (A) > # maxi (B). Let # maxi (B) = g and 
# maxi (A) = g + t (where t > O). Further, let maxi(B) = {b l , ... , bg} and 
maxi (A) = {al, ... , ag, ... ,ag+t}. Note that maxi {al, ... , ag} = {al, ... ,ag}. Hence, 
by 4.2, 
{al, ... ,ag} /"Vi B (4.10) 
since maxi (A) = {al, , ag, ... ,ag+t} it is clear that Tg+I = maxi {al, ... ,ag} U 
{ag+l} is such that {al, ,ag} ~ Tg+I and maxi(Tg+l \ {al, ... ,ag}) =1- 0. Then by 
IMONi and 4.10, it follows that 
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and by 4.10 
Tg+I >-i maxi (B) (4.11) 
Taking 4.11, adding ag+2, ... ,ag+t on the left hand.side, and using IMONi , I have 
(4.12) 
Taking 4.12 and using similar argument for the proof of 4.8, by IMONi , I have 
A >-i B. It is also known that A""í B by 4.2. Then By P-2 A >- B which proves 
4.9. 4.2 and 4.9 complete the proof of the sufficiency part of the proposition. I 
I have already commented on the differences between the rule just character­
ized and the relation ~*. There are situations where there may be sorne interest 
in strengthening the requirements to declare a set preferred to another in terms 
of freedom. In the previous example about free press we were dealing with an 
issue of fundamental rights. Once any reasonable person agree that no available 
journal represents a reasonable choice we may need to impose a stronger criterion 
to discriminate between two sets despite the previous indifference. A way to in­
crease the requirements to determine the indifference between two sets is to use 
fuH lexicographic domination. 
The binary relation ~1 that represents a lexicographic version of ~* is such 
that, 
for aH A, BE Z, [A ~I B iff #maxi (A) ~ #maxi (B) for aH i] (4.13) 
Proposition 4.3. ~ satisfies SNIY, COM, P-l, P-3 and IJvION if and only if 
>-=>-1
"" ",,' 
Proof. 
The necessity part of the proposition is obvious; I prove only the sufficiency 
parto Let ~ satisfy SNDi , COM, P-1, P-3 and IMONi . First, I show: 
for aH A, Í3 E Z, if # maxi (A) = # maxi (B) for aH i, then A "" B. (4.14) 
Suppose A,B E Z and #maxi (A) = #maxi (B) = g. Let maxi (A) = 
{al, ... , ag } and maxi (B) = {bl , ... , bg } • By SNDi , 
(4.15) 
and 
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~ ~~ -~~--~-------r----:--------------------------c---------
{a2} "-Ji {b2}. (4.16) 
{al} n {bd = {a2} n {b2} = 0 and, further maxi ({al}) = {ad ,maxi ({a2}) = 
{a2} and maxi ({bl }) = {bl } ,maxi ({b2}) = {b2} (since al,a2 E maxi (A) and 
bl , b2 E maxi (B)). Hence by 4.15, 4.16 and COM, I have 
(4.17) 
By SNDi , again, 
(4.18) 
By 4.17, 4.18 and COM, 
(4.19) 
Proceeding in this way, finally I have {al, ... ,ag} "-Ji {bl , .oo, bg}, that is maxi (A) "-Ji 
max i (B). If A = maxi(A) , then A "-Ji maxi (B). Suppose {A\maxi(A)} =10. Let 
{A\ maxi(A)} = {ih, ... ,am } =10. It is clear that TI = maxi(A) U{al} is such that 
TI S;;; A and maxi(A \ TI) = 0. Then by IMONi and 4.19, I have A ",i maxi (B) in 
this case. Thus, in all cases, 
(4.20) 
Similarly, using IMON i in 4.20, A "-Ji B for all i. By P-1 A "-J B which proves 
4.14. 
Next, I show: 
for all A,B E Z, if #maxi (A) > #maxi (B) for all i, then A >- B. (4.21) 
Suppose A, B E Z and # maxi (A) > # maxi (B). Let # maxi (B) = 9 and 
# maxi (A) = 9 + t (where t > O). Further, let maxi(B) = {b l , ... , bg} and 
maxi (A) = {al, ... ,ag, ... ,ag+t}. Note that maxi {al, ... ,ag} = {al, oo., ag} . Hence, 
by 4.14, 
{al, ... ,ag}"-JiB (4.22) 
since maxi (A) = {al, ,ag, ... ,ag+t} it is clear that Tg+I = maxi {al, ... ,ag} U 
{ag+l} is such that {al, ,ag} S;;; Tg+I and maxi(Tg+I \ {al, ... ,ag}) =10. Then by 
IMONi and 4.22, it follows that 
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and by 4.22 
Tg+l >-í maxí (B) (4.23) 
Taking 4.23, adding a g+2, ... , agH on the left hand side, and using IMONí, I have 
(4.24) 
Taking 4.24 and using similar argument for the proof of 4.20, by IMONí , I have 
A >-í B,and this for aH i. By P-3 .(B ~ A) which proves 4.21. 
Next, I show: 
. { # max í (A) > # max í (B) then A is non comparable with Bfor aH A, B E Z, lf # maxj (A) < # maxj (B) 
(4.25) 
Using the previous argument I have the conclusion that A >-í B and by P-3 
.(B ~ A) and B >-j A and .(A ~ B). Then A and B are non comparable. 
4.14, 4.21 and 4.25 complete the proof of the sufficiency part of the proposi­
tion. I 
Both lexicographic rules turn out to be very similar in terms of the axioms 
that characterized them. They share in their characterizations the axioms SNDí , 
COM, IMONí (that link them with ~*) and P-1. The difference between ~i and 
~I relies in axioms P-2 and P-3. While axiom P-2 gives decisive power over the 
ranking of A and B to the first P(pí) that discriminates between both sets. P­
3 only to guarantees that once a decisive set of preferences P(pí) is found the 
ranking of the sets in terms of freedom will not contradict this resulto As we have 
seen this is the difference that determine which lexicographic rule is characterized. 
An example may clarify the differences between ~i and ~I. Let A = {x, z, u} 
and B = {w,u} be two sets of alternatives. Let's consider that the preferences 
that a reasonable person may have in a society are in the foHowing list: 
u z u z w 
x u y w z 
v v z x u 
w x x v x 
z y w y v 
y w v u y 
In each ranking shown above, the elements are arranged in strictly descending 
order of preference. We can easily see that A rvO B, A >-1 B, A >- 2 B, A rv3 B, 
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A ",,4 E, A -<5 E. It means that according to the rules defined, A >-i E. However, 
A and E are declared non comparable by ~:;I. Finally, it is easy to check that both 
t* and tI are independent and implies ti. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The problem studied in this paper has been previously considered by several 
authors. One of the main questions that has come up in this context is the 
role of preferences over the various alternatives in assessing an agent's freedom. 
Pattanaik and Xu (1990) use a set ofaxioms that do not refer to preferences at 
all. Their axioms imply a ranking of opportunity sets based exclusively on their 
cardinality. On the other hand, Sen (1991, 1993), Foster (1992) and Puppe (1996) 
have argued in favor of introducing preferences as the basis for the evaluation of 
opportunity sets in terms of freedom. 
This paper extend the initial approach of Pattanaik and Xu (1997) based on 
the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may have. It uses 
these orderings and introduces the idea that the sets of alternatives offer freedom 
only if they are able to provide meaningful choices to the persons in the society. 
The alternatives no considered in the feasible sets are relevant for assessing 
the freedom that the feasible sets offer. This aspect of freedom is captured by 
the formulation proposed in this paper. The specification of the set of relevant 
alternatives formulate in the paper takes into account the fact that expectations 
have a role to play in considering freedom. For example, let's consider the alter­
native to go for a business trip to America from Europe sailing in a XV century 
ship. This is an alternative even in the XX century, however it is remotely a 
relevant alternative even if 1 cannot afford a plane ticket. If suddenly the world 
ran out of oil and there are no longer intercontinental airplanes or modern ships 
then the alternative to sail in a caravel becomes relevant. Any change in the set 
of universal alternatives can change the perception over the freedom that a set of 
alternatives can give. 
The perception that a particular agent has of her effective freedom depends not 
only on the feasible alternatives but also on the set of unfeasible alternatives that 
contribute to shape her aspirations and focus her achievements in the construction 
of vital projects capable to provide a meaningfullife. 
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